Back in July I was given punishement by Morrill for wearing headphones while I was jogging. This punsihment was basically hard labor. I was to fill over three hundred fifty-pound sandbags in full combat gear in over 130 degree heat. I did file a complaint and spoke to the commanding officer, at which time I was told I would face a general court martial or field grade article 15, two very severe punishments. In December of last year another member of TF Konohiki attacked two Iraqi Iterpreters choking one and throwing him into a bonfire, when one of his fellow Iraqis came to his aid he was also punched. This man was a convicted felon for assault and had been brought up on assault charges during training at Fort Bliss, Texas. This man recieved no more punishment then confinment to quarters for three days.Now comes the big picture.
On July 4th we held an Hawaiian style PORK bbq I wrote about in my blog, I was soon criticized by Morrills friends in the comments section for being critical of him not respecting Islam and our twelve Muslim team members.
On July 6th at just about 2pm while preparing to leave the FOB for a combat patrol with the 128th the crew from Konohiki 51 arrived. the gunner for this team, a specialist from the 81st out of Washington, asked me if I remembered the Intel team that went by the nickname of "Peanut and Butter", I told him I met them just once. He then said quite bluntly, as was his style, "Well they're both dead now. They got hit a few hours ago over on Heather near the old checkpoint 69. And they got it bad, as matter of fact their vehicle is still burning with them still in it!".. (Checkpoint 69 was a recently deserted Iraqi Army checkpoint)
As he said this I paused for a few seconds because we had passed by that very spot several times and would continue to do so. I remember thinking that if my number came up I hoped that my body wouldn't be so horribly disfigured that my family would have to keep the casket closed. I don't mean to be overly morbid or grafic but it is important one understands the state of mind at this time. And like everyone else in my posistion I went out and did my job and just wondered if this would be the day.
Five days later on the 11th of July we were on the move towards the Boa bridge, it had just been cleared as safe to cross by elements of the Iraqi Army. For reasons unknown the lead vehicle from the 128th decided not to cross over and made a right. As we got close to the bridge an IED exploded directly in front of us, it was meant to kill us. I wrote about this in "Anxiety on th Bridge". I realized then, I still had a long way to go before I would see my family again.
Two days later I decided to take a long run and listen too some music. So about seven in the morning while it was still relativly cool I strapped on my headset and took a long slow run, it helps with dealing with issues. Several vehicles passed by me and I always run into traffic with my headphones low enough to hear every thing around me, especially the very loud diesel engines of military vehicles. One of the vehicles that passed me was driven by Lankey Morrill.
At about 8pm that same evening Morrill got up to run his mouth, as usual, and this time reminded everyone in TF Konohiki that the FOB Seargeant Major had published a directive dated 1 July, reminding soldiers not to run with headphones on, Immediatly after he approached me with a counsling statement in his hand and told me he didn't want to put me on the spot but that he was referring to my morning run. I then said "is there something you want me to sign?" I was referring to the counsling statement in his hand which I knew was for me. He then said " Let's just forget about this for now. What I was hoping was that if you could help out one of the men being punished by supervising his building a parking lot?". I said I would help out and would get with this soldier later.
I learned from the soldier that Morrill had decided it would be constructive for him to build a sandbag parking lot in our gravel lot, this was a result of him failing to report a minor fender bender with one of the new HUMVEES. Another soldier from Hawaii did something very similar resulting in the loss of a front bumper and only recieved a warning. Morrill was very blatent in his bias.
Three days later Morrill got up in front of the unit and asked me why I hadn't finished building his parking lot, this was a flat out lie on his part and I could not control my reaction. I then said very clearly "You never said a word about filling any sandbags! all you said was to supervise and that was it!" Of course Morrill denied it and said he would talk talk to me after the meeting. I felt like running across the room and kicking the crap out of this pathetic loser As soon as the meeting was over I walked over to him and said something to this effect "What is wrong with you any way ? We've got people getting blown to pieces and risking their lives everyday and all you can do is sit around here and think of ways to abuse your authority? You never said a word about filling any sandbags and if that's what you want you better put it in writing like you are supposed to." I said a few more things and will admit I was out of line, I was disrespectful to a senior NCO and should have put the NCO corps ahead of my disgust.
Later that evening Morrill came to my quarters with his write-up, and I then told him I wished to speak with the commanding officer and later the office of the Inspector General. I was told a few days later I was clear to talk to the Commander. The Commander would come for me.
Maybe two days later Konohoki six, the commander, told me to meet him in MSG Morrills room. I got to the room and the Commander told me he was not going to wait around until I felt like talking to him and he wanted to hear what I wanted to say before Morrill left on his R&R that day.
I asked for permission to speak freely and was granted it so long as I remained respectful. I basically unloaded on Morrill for everything from the loss of money for the Internet to calling privates Seargeant to getting his picture taken with a woman that has a child dying. There was alot said between me and Konohiki six and I will say for the most part I was very proud of his posistion, supporting his NCO. I know this sounds hypocritical but I believe that certain things must be maintained for the greater good and one of those is Officers supporting their NCOs. I could only hope that Konohiki six would end up doing the right thing and getting rid of Morrill, he wouldn't.
Two things came out very clear to me during this meeting. It was here that I was told by the Commanding Officer that every person in TF Konohiki that paid any money for Internet service authorized by Morrill could "just forget about it, the money is gone and it's not coming back so just deal with it", those are pretty close to the exact words. Perhaps the most important thing said to me was that as a result of my conduct, telling Morrill about soldiers getting killed and risking their lives just to get back here and have him give them write-ups and hard labor for jogging, I had three choices. One, fill the sandbags, two face a general court martial or three recieve a field grade article 15. The last two options really were not options since I could very easily lose all my retirement and leave Iraq as a private. I chose to fill the sandbags.
The commander made three minor comments to me that I found amusing. One was that our group was just like the HBO series "Band of Brothers" another was that I didn't seem to want to "join the family" at dinner time ( whenever he showed up we could eat ) and tended to eat alone, the last was that I seemed to think Morrill had to live up to my personal expectations. I was really dissapointed that the commanding Officer didn't seem to realize that all any of the men wanted was for Morrill to follow Army regulations and guidelines like FM22-100 leadership and Army regulation 600-20.
The next day I went to the office of the FOB Command Seargeant Major and asked him for some guidance enforcing his rule of jogging and listening to headphones. He was really suprised I would ask such a stupid question and said "It's a no brainer, you just do an on the spot correction. Stop the soldier and correct the situation like a good Seargeant." I then said "At what point should I consider giving out a counseling statement?' He then said "after maybe the third verbal warning." I had to ask one last thing, I asked "and at what point should I recommend punishment.?" He then laughed and said "Are you an asshole or something? that's ridiculus he's just jogging."
All this is just to really drive home the petty behavior of one person giving the responsability of caring for the welfare of many. The lack of competance in this man was and is unbelievable, overshadowed only by the willingous of the Officers to allow it. As I write this I want to remind all readers that at this moment there are quite a few enlisted soldiers serving prison time for things getting out of hand at "Abhu Grahib" prison and not one officer served a day.
Because the second part of this "Crime and punishment" entry will be so long I will publish a part one first. But I will say this before I publish part two. The man that assaulted the two Iraqi's is a good man and, the truth be known, I am personally glad he did not get punished. But this is about people doing what they are supposed to do and following Army regulations and guidlines. The man comes from Samoa and they tend to handle things with their fists and really don't see any wrong in it, but the Army does. I want the truth to be known and do not feel like this is sharing my dirty laundry with the world. Because the people are giving authority they must also be held accountable to someone when they do not act responsibly.
PS. I did not wear all my gear when I filled the bags and brought my music with me along with ice cold drinks, to hell with Morrill. And I took my time, rememebering what it's like to be a grunt as I filled each bag, I made it fun.
After you spoke to the Commander, the asshole Maj Harris, I'm assuming, did you go forward with speaking with the Inspector General?
It's unfortunate when a senior NCO puts aside his military professionalism and lets his personal feelings for a team member shine through. This is clearly what happened with you. Morrill did not like you and therefore punished and humiliated you on a regular basis. But damn it all it really pisses me off the most that the Commander not only stood by and let him do it but enforced it!
If I were you I would be writing letters to anybody I could get to listen about BOTH of them. GO OVER THIER HEADS! They are not Gods and even though one is an officer, he still is not a God. He has his superiors to answer to too! This man is only a Major. There are many ranks above him.
I know that there was another Commander that came later, a LTC I believe. Him and Harris did not get along, just so you know. They hated each other! Why not contact him and see what he says? He might be the one person that would be willing to help you.
Just a suggestion man but if it were me, I'd turn over hell just to make sure these two, especially the Commander, got what was coming to them!
Major Harris can not be allowed to be in charge of a combat unit again. I'm sure by now he's back in his cozy fat chair and office somewhere in the states. But you should see to it this goes on his record!
I am Steven C Hawley and I commanded Task Force Konokiki from APR-DEC06. Any failures of the Task Force are mine alone. Any successes of TF KONOHIKI are the result of the great men who stood among our number and their collective effort.
No one should blame MSG Morrill, nor MAJ Harris, nor the S3, nor any other leader of TFK for any failures or shortcoming. If there are any, they are mine alone—and I do not mean that in a shallow sense to deflect blame. I have sought command all my life and one of my greatest rewards has been command of TF KONOHIKI. No man can be given a more sacred trust than command of American Soldiers in combat. I did the best I could and if there were shortcomings, problems, or inequities they are due to my leadership as I commanded the Task Force—no one else.
I’ve read this Blog for some time, as Elias well knows. Like the good Soldier he is he acknowleged and registered the Blog IAW regulations as we understood them in the combat zone. While I agree with his recollection of the events herein in the macro—I certainly do not agree with them as they are interpreted from a command group perspective and more importantly I do NOT agree with them in terms of the overall tone they portray reflecting what is was our men accomplished in Iraq.
Task Force KONOHIKI (TFK) was unique in terms of composition. Known somewhat sarcastically as “the UberMiTT” by our 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division superiors we accomplished MUCH with what was really a very small but personal contribution to our national war strategy. As a result of these men efforts’—the Men of TFK—the 4th Iraqi Battalion was the first in its’ entire divisional area to assume battle space and responsibility for terrain. Basically [simplistically] what that means is that where once there were 400+ American Soldiers risking their lives—there is now the 4th Iraqi Battalion doing its job—led, now, by only a small USMC MiTT team that replace us. We accomplished this feat in a small amount of time with much effort, and some expense in blood. Many Iraqi Soldiers, and some leaders lost their lives in this period.
The greatest challenge I faced as the leader of TFK was building a sense of Team from a group of Guardsmen and Reservists of several different commands while, balancing the requirements of accomplishing the mission [preparing the 4IA Bn and engaging the enemy] along with taking care of the precious Men entrusted to my care. All my men made it home—some were wounded in our collective endeavor [Moore, Brown, Anguay—and perhaps others in manners we haven’t discovered yet]. We had to come together as a small group/team—in essence we were functioning as an elete force in terms of mission and expectations although we didn’t have the personnel/personal experience—I simply had to get the best out of what we had been given. Some Soldiers vastly exceeded my expectations, given their limited experience. I was in awe of what they did. Some soldiers greatly disappointed me, given their previous experience-but lack of contribution/growth. While I may have disagreed with some of what MSG Morrill did as our CSM—both before and after I arrived—he deserves great credit for personally fighting the Army bureaucracy to acquire the latest and best armor for our vehicles and our personal protective body armorer. After all the advise and counsel seeking is over however, command of the task force was mine—so any problems attributed should be directed to me.
My intent here is NOT to engage in a public debate. I’ll not do so. I do know that awards and punishments engender a lot of emotion and debate. As they have been publicly commented upon in this Blog I’ll just say this. I [Me personally] decided whom would get what awards. Not ALL officers got BSMs, in fact some officers got no awards whatsoever. Not all officers [nor all NCOs] got very good evaluations. I gave folks what I thought they deserved. My evaluation criteria [potential/expectation/contribution] was bounced off of senior NCOs and the senior officer leadership but the final decision was mine alone. I can tell you that when senior 29BCT leadership found out I was not recommending some officers and NCOs for awards that there was some consternation, but I personally justified my decisions and they withstood judgement. Award decision was mine—it is not an exact science and the award of one individual mentioned earlier in this Blog is one that I though long and hard over—I am not perfect. I did what I did. It is revealing as to the limitations to this Blog--and the author's field of vision--that there is no mention of the formal [officer & NCO] evaluations. I was the senior rater in almost ever case and those that exceeded expections got reviews that will help ensure they attain future leadership positions within the Guard and Reserve--those that do not deserve higher/future leaderhship positions were worded accordingly. An evaluation from a combat zone [exemplary or otherwise] will be very telling in future carriers. I am very optimistic about some of the young Guard and Reserve leaders whom I saw under sustained stress in combat--our Army will be in good hands in their cases.
I do not agree with the characterization of UCMJ decisions and punishments as they are depicted in this Blog. It is true that MSG Morrill exercised a lot of authority. He exercised the authority I granted to the senior enlisted officer as my personal command representative. If there are any errors in judgment or execution they are mine alone as he briefed me on all decisions that I am aware he publically announced. The macro details are all there-Elias is correct in that regard—but the rational and the nuances by which a commander decides the way he does are not ‘out there’ nor will they be as they are both personal, private, and subject to legal protection. It is Elias’ time honored privilege and protection to criticize my decisions. I’ll just point out they are mine as I commanded the TF, not MSG Morrill, nor MAJ Harris's after Apr. It may be—it probably certainly is—that MSG Morrill made some mistakes. I will tell you this—I made mistakes. There are certainly things I wish I had done better while in command of TF K. I think we all wish we could have done better—I also think we also did pretty damn good considering the circumstances.
At the end of all this, what makes me most sad here is that I have to defend the conduct and amazing contribution of a great bunch of American Soldiers. At the end of the Vietnam War the Army Chief (Abrams) determined that the professional Army should never be configured and manned again such that it could wage war on its own as a quasi-professional [mercenary] army. Creighton Abrams, and the Joint Chiefs, reconfigured the US Military such that it could never again be committed to sustained combat without committing substantial portions of the Guard and the Reserve—thereby committing the American people. I am a professional Soldier and have proudly been one all my life. It has been my great great honor to lead these young Citizen Soldiers in combat and after watching them in action I personally am filled with optimism about the future of our country’s leadership. We, TASK FORCE KONOHIKI, did a lot of really good relevant, dangerous, work on the battlefield that positively contributed to our national war effort in a small but intensly pertinent way. We may have done some things wrong and we may have been able to do some things better but WE DID GOOD ---any shortcomings are entirely my responsibility.
Steven C Hawley
Lieutenant Colonel
US Army
TF K 06
I would like to say that it was an honor to be under your command.
I think you used MSG Morril in a positive/negative way. You empowered a Senior NCO during combat operations; its too bad you empowered the wrong NCO. I went to the smart guy on the second floor. He always calmed me down. He kept my morale up and gave me direction when MSG gave none.
Awards. As I remember the regulation, if anyone is deserving of an award, award them for going "above and beyond" of their duty scopes. If they are just doing their job - then, do soldiers deserve an award? By the way, anyone can still recommend a soldier for an award two years after the fact.
As I read your comments, you are still defending Morrill. I may not agree what you wrote but I surely respect you even more due to the fact that you are still defending a Senior NCO. Good or bad. Damn.
The general may not given you the best E8 in the Army but its like what I heard you whisper. "THE GENERAL DOES NOT GIVE ME WHAT I WANT. THE GENERAL GIVES ME WHAT I NEED."
Elias
I really loved this TF of ours. It is filled with bright men who deserves more. Let Americans remember Task Force Konohiki in a good positive way about the men. Not that man (MSG Morrill).
Remember, "when we go back to stateside, we begin our story as we, not I."
Mahalo Nui Loa
To the author:
What is the endstate of this blog? The enduring theme is to "let people know" what occurred during your tour in Iraq--I see more bad than good. The people reading this blog should know about the good things your TF did and perhaps should even be made aware of some of the bad things. They however can not do anything about it. You are doing a damn good job of getting a reaction but you are doing nothing for your unit unless you are using your chain of command and fixing the problem. And oh, by the way, just because you are inactive National Guard, the problem still exists. Taking off the uniform until the next tour does not preclude you all from your duties.
The American people (your audience here) are not in your chain, they merely benefit through your sacrifice--and I imagine some of them are scratching their heads and wondering what the hell is going on when a former CO of the unit is defending his command decisions in a damn Ventura County Star blog.
Bottom line, I want to read more about the brave men and women of your unit and less (much less, in fact ZERO) about MSG Morrill. You are defining your unit's legacy through the actions or inactions of one man!!!
Furthermore:
I am starting to find it extremely hard to believe that this MSG Morrill was as bad as you make him out to be. If this turd was stinking up my unit he would have been gone in a heartbeat. No single person regardless of rank can ever break the will of the many. That is why LEADERS need to have LEADERSHIP--the fine art of influencing others to do that which they would not. And the good ones make you want to do it, believe in it, and do it again and again. Otherwise those stars, bars, and stripes don't mean shit but a paycheck.
Gunner
Well put major. You write exactly how you speak. I worked with good men not bad. I liked working with task force konohiki. I am hoped that the marines were as good as the konohikis. I got to say that sergeant majir morrel was not liked by us because he alway messed the schedules for us and he felt he is god.
I hope to see you all again soon. We all are reading this including majir essam.
Tirp Blade