Part of the NCO creed requires that we all vow to be technically and tactically profecient, soldiers lives depend on it. What this basically means is that as military leaders we can combine the technical knowledge of weapons systems and their capabilities with tactical know how and give the men in our command the maximum oppurtunity to survive and win.

For example, a soldier might understand the range of a particular machine gun used for the defense can be bipod or tripod fired. The maximume effective range for a bipod fired weapon is generally about half that of a tripod fired weapon. He may also know that this particular weapon has three rates of fire, sustained, rapid and cyclic. The rates of fire a weapon is used at will determine the length the weapon can be fired and how much ammunition will be needed. He might also understand the trajectory of the rounds through the air at different ranges, and the pattern of impact on the selected target ( The Beaten Zone ) . A soldier will then take this knowledge and apply it to the tactical situation. Knowing the best position to emplace the weapon and how to use it, this is tactical and technical knowledge.

MSG Morrill was almost completly void of both tactics and technical know how. His insistance on doing what he felt was best instead of listening to those that actually knew what to do placed many soldiers lives at risk, I will give just few more examples of this mans incompetance.

While going through weapons firing drills prior to coming home one of the men firing the machine gun was clearly firing at the cyclic rate, holding down the trigger and just firing away at over 800 rounds a minute. Morrill jumped up on the turrett of the vehicle and started screaming about how the weapon should never be fired at more than three to five rounds a burst or squeeze of the trigger, not true at all. Most machine guns will be fired at the basic rate of six to nine rounds per burst, gunners say "Six to nine everytime". This is the sustained rate of fire allowing ten minutes of firing befor a barrell change. The rapid rate of fire is ten to twenty rounds a burst before a barrell change at five minutes. The cyclic rate is just holding down the trigger for one minute, then changing the barrell or it will malfunction and possibly melt. There is a time and place for each rate of fire," tactics". Morrill was just faking knowledge knowing that he would not be openly challenged. The man was so arrogant he would have people follow his direction even though it was wrong and men could get hurt. A three to five round burst would not be enough to effectivly cover a small area target like another crew served weapon emplacement and the " Beaten Zone " lacked area, of course he wouldn't know this.

Here's another example of him not wanting to learn the proper way of doing something and insisting on what he had decided on, right or wrong.

It is a common belief that speed is one of the biggest defense factors to be considered when traveling on the MSRs ( Main Supply Routes ) the faster a vehicle can move the harder it will be for the trigger man to set of the IED and inflict damage on the target. Well Morrill took this as an absolute and would make us drive as fast as possible at all times and never considered using one of the Armys mandated tools, the "Risk Assessment". This is just what it sounds like, pior to taking a course of action or begining training, leaders should consider all variables that may effect the mission and decide if the risk is a minimal as possible. To lower the risk, some things must be altered or simply left out. Don't take a risk you don't have too.

Early in our deplyment we had run a six vehicle convoy about fifty miles north to Tikrit. As we were leaving FOB O'Ryan we came to an MP checkpoint, I was in the lead vehicle and was ordered to stop by the MPs. At this point none of us knew thew reason for the stop but did know on the main road we were safe and abviosly the MP's had secured the immediate area. Morrill, like the egomaniacal person he is, called foward on the radio and instructed us to go around the MP's. To do this we would have to leave the security of the hard packed road and travel on the shoulder were most all IED's are placed, he was ready to risk getting us in the lead vehicle blown to pieces just to show his authority over us and bypass an MP roadblock. My driver who had been there a year already and was from th 81st out of Washington couldn't believe what he had heard, he had already seen members of his unit killed doing just that. Luckily the MP's waved us through before we exposed our under bellies to a possible IED. But this was just the begining of Morrills exposing the men to death.

On the way back from Tikrit later that day we were on MSR Tampa southbound. We were a convoy of six HUMVEES and were moving at about sixty-five miles an hour when we came up on the rear of a much larger convoy alomost one mile long, they were moving a little faster than fifty miles an hour. From past guidance from Morrill it was decided we would pass this convoy and, therefore, reduce the risk of getting hit by an IED, at least that was his theory.

We could clearly see it was far too large a convoy to pass on the same road and many of the bigger heavier vehicles couldn't see us from the rear and might run into us. So it was decided we would cross over the center median, jump into the northbound lane and drive head-on into oncoming traffic. What this meant was that top heavy vehicles prone to overturning and some modified with metal plates would cross over at different points in the median. This would first expose us to explosions from underneath, secondly we would do so at a high rate of speed and risk flipping over in the loose soil, next we possibly crash head first into on coming traffic and lastly we would now have to possible engage unsuspecting oncoming Iraqi traffic.( I must point out that 25% of all deaths in Iraq are from accidents and most of those are vehicle accidents )

As we crossed over into the oncoming lanes we encountered a oncoming coalition convoy almost exactly like the one we just passed, big, heavy and fast. It was coming right at us and kicking up alot of dust and debris. Often times we came within inches of a headon collision. I will say that was one of the most dangerous exposures I had seen in Iraq. I lost sight of our vehicle to the front many times and know we suprised many of the drivers coming towards us, communiction between us and both convoys was not feasable although possible with some effort.

As we cleared the end of the first convoy after a solid five minutes of dust and near accidents we again exposed ourselves to IED's by crossing the dirt median. Even if we had been able to cross at the exact same point we just gave an insurgent six chances to kill Americans.

Was it worth the risk ? I will just say that when I got hit by an IED on MSR Tampa in May we were going over sixty miles an hour. The only thing that spared us from death was the lack of training on timing on the part of the trigger man that day. Does speed help ? Yes, of course it does but prudent thinking dictates that one not assume a dozen more risks just to got five MPH faster.

Guys like Morrill are all over the Reserve and Gaurd system and really need to go away. I will say also that Major Harris was our Executive Officer and only acting commander. I liked him and found him rational and amiable and can not understand why Morrill was given the power of life and death over so many good men. I have a theory on that I will share soon and it has to do with politics and numbers.

My next entry will be the last to focus on Morrill simply because I think most readers have a good picture of this guy. I could make dozens more entires on the poor performance of this guy and end up not mentioning some of the great men of Konohiki that really held things together. Even though most of them did not recieve a "Bronze Star" for meritorious conduct on the 19th of December 2005.